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Abstract
Tackling the problem of ordinal preference
revelation and reasoning, we propose a novel
methodology for generating an ordinal util-
ity function from a set of qualitative prefer-
ence statements. To the best of our knowl-
edge, our proposal constitutes the first non-
parametric solution for this problem that is
both efficient and semantically sound. Our
initial experiments provide strong evidence
for practical effectiveness of our approach.
1 INTRODUCTION
Human preferences are a key concept in decision the-
ory, and as such have been studied extensively in phi-
losophy, psychology, and economics (e.g., [10, 12, 14]).
The central goals have been to provide logical, cog-
nitive, and mathematical models of human decision
making. More recently this research effort was joined
by AI researchers, motivated by the goal of automating
the process of decision support. To illustrate the need
for automated decision support, consider the nowa-
days common task of searching for some goods in a
database of an online vendor such as Amazon.com or
eBay. Such databases are too large for a user to search
exhaustively. Using the purchase of a used car as an
example, a decision support system might allow a user
to state preferences like “I like ecologically friendly
cars”, “I prefer Mercedes to Lada”, or “For a sport
car, I prefer red color to black color”. The system
should then use these preference statements to guide
the user to the relevant parts of the database.
Various logics of preference, graphical preference rep-
resentation models, preference learning and reasoning
algorithms have been proposed in AI in the last three
decades [4, 8, 9]. While these works have made signif-
icant contributions, there is still a substantial gap be-
tween theory and practice of decision support. In par-
ticular, so far there is no single framework for revealing
user preferences and reasoning about them that is both
generically scalable and generically robust, i.e. both ef-
ficient and effective for any set of decision alternatives
and any form of preference information. It is clear
nowadays that getting closer to such a universal frame-
work requires new insights into the problem [8, 21].
In this paper, we tackle this challenge in the scope
of revelation and reasoning about ordinal preferences
(i.e., as in the database search example above), and
develop a robust solution for this problem that is both
efficient and effective. Specifically, we propose a novel
methodology for generating an ordinal utility func-
tion from a set of qualitative preference statements.
Our proposal is based on a somewhat surprising mix-
ture of techniques from knowledge representation and
machine learning. We show formally that it leads to
a flexible and unprecedentedly powerful tool for rea-
soning about ordinal preference statements. Further-
more, we present experiments that provide initial ev-
idence for practical applicability and effectiveness of
our method, making it promising for a wide spectrum
of decision-support applications.
1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT AND
BACKGROUND
Using the used-car database search as our running ex-
ample, the content of the database constitutes the rel-
evant subset of all possible choice alternatives Ω. The
ordinal preferences of a user who wants to buy a car
can be viewed as a (possibly weak, possibly partial)
binary preference relation P over Ω [12]. A decision
support system should allow its user to state her pref-
erences, use these statements to approximate P , and
present the database content in a way that enables the
user to quickly home in on desirable alternatives.
The choice alternatives in such scenarios are typi-
cally described in terms of some attribution X =
{X1, . . . , Xn} abstracting Ω to X = ×Dom(Xi) (e.g.,
attributes of the database schema), and the user can
express her preferences in terms ofX. Now, what pref-
erence information can we expect the users to provide?
As suggested in the used-car example (and supported
by multi-disciplinary literature [8, 12]), typically users
should be expected to provide only qualitative prefer-
ence statements that either compare between pairs of
complete alternatives (e.g., “I prefer this alternative
to that alternative”), or generalize user’s preference
over some properties of Ω (e.g., “In a minivan, I pre-
fer automatic transmission to manual transmission.”)
Formally, this means that the user provides us with a
qualitative preference expression
S = {s1, . . . , sm} = {〈ϕ1 =1 ψ1〉, · · · , 〈ϕm =m ψm〉}, (1)
consisting of a set of such preference statements
{s1, . . . , sm}, where ϕi, ψi are logical formulas, =i ∈
{Â,º,∼}, and Â, º, and ∼ have the standard seman-
tics of strong preference, weak preference, and pref-
erential equivalence, respectively. For ease of presen-
tation, we assume attributes X are boolean1 (denot-
ing Dom(Xi) = {xi, xi}), and ϕi, ψi are propositional
logic formulas over X.
Given such a preference expression S, one has to in-
terpret what information S conveys about P , decide
on a representation for this information, and decide on
the actual reasoning machinery. Several proposals for
direct logical reasoning about S have been made, yet
all these proposals are limited by (this or another) ef-
ficiency/expressiveness tradeoff. In attempt to escape
this tradeoff as much as possible, several works in AI
(e.g., see [5, 18]) proposed to compile information car-
ried by S into an ordinal utility function
U : X 7→ R (2)
consistent with (what we believe S tells us about) P ,
that is requiring
∀x,x′ ∈ X . U(x) ≥ U(x′)⇒ P 6|= x′ Â x . (3)
In what follows, we refer to the task of constructing
such a utility function U from S as ordinal utility rev-
elation (OUR). Observe that specifying a utility func-
tion U as in (2) can be expensive due to the fact that
|X | = O(2n). Hence, previous works on OUR searched
for special conditions under which U can be repre-
sented compactly (e.g., see [1, 3, 5, 11, 17, 18]). The
general scheme followed by these works (which we refer
to as independence-based methodology) is as follows.
First, one defines certain “independence conditions”
on X, and provides a “representation theorem” stat-
ing that under these conditions U can be compactly
specified. Second, one possibly defines some additional
conditions under which U can also be efficiently gen-
erated from S. Finally, assuming all these conditions
1Extending our framework to arbitrary finite-domain
variables is straightforward, yet requires a more involved
notation that we decided to avoid here.
lead to restricting user expressions S to simplified lan-
guages that incorporate this prior assumption. In
summary, computationally efficient schemes for multi-
attribute utility revelation proposed in economics and
AI are parametrized by the structure that user prefer-
ences induce on X, and thus are applicable only when
such structure exists and is known to the system.
1.2 CHALLENGES AND OUR RESULTS
Having in mind these limitations, let us return back
to the needs of decision-support application, and list
the challenges these applications pose to the research
on OUR. The vision here is threefold. First, the
user should be able to provide preference expressions
S while being as little constrained in her language
as possible. Second, the utility revelation machin-
ery should be completely non-parametric, i.e., free of
any explicit assumptions about the structure of user
preferences. Third, both utility revelation (i.e., gener-
ating U from S) and using the revealed utility func-
tion should be computationally efficient, including the
case where user preferences pose no significant inde-
pendence structure on X whatsoever.
In this paper, we present the first approach that ful-
fills these goals. Combining ideas from knowledge rep-
resentation, machine learning, and philosophical logic
we provide a concrete mathematical setting in which
all the above desiderata can be successfully achieved,
and formally show that this setting is appealing both
semantically and computationally. The mathemati-
cal framework we propose is based on a novel high-
dimensional structure for preference decomposition,
and a specific adaptation of certain standard tech-
niques for high-dimensional continuous optimization,
frequently used in machine learning in the context of
Support Vector Machines (SVMs) [22].
2 HIGH-DIMENSIONAL
PREFERENCE
DECOMPOSITION
Considering our vision for preference revelation, one
can certainly be somewhat skeptical. Indeed, how can
OUR be efficient if the user preferences pose no sig-
nificant independence structure on X, or, if they do,
the system is not provided with this independence in-
formation? The basic idea underlying our proposal is
simple: Since we are not provided with a sufficiently
useful independence information in the original space
X , maybe we should move to a different space in which
no independence information is required?
Specifically, let us schematically map the alternatives
X into a new, higher dimensional space F using
Φ : X 7→ F = R4n . (4)
As one would expect, the mapping Φ is not arbitrary.
Let F = {f1, · · · , f4n} be the dimensions of F , and
D =
⋃
Dom(Xi) be the union of attribute domains
in X. Let val : F → 2D be a bijective mapping from
the dimensions of F onto the power set of D, uniquely
associating each dimension fi with a subset val(fi) ⊆
{x1, x1, · · · , xn, xn}. In what follows, by Var(fi) ⊆ X
we denote the subset of attributes “instantiated” by
val(fi). Given that, for each x ∈ X and fi ∈ F, we set:
Φ(x)[i] =
{
1, val(fi) ⊆ x
0, otherwise
(5)
From (5) it is easy to see that dimensions fi with val(fi)
containing both a literal and its negation are effectively
redundant. Indeed, later we show that we actually use
only the (3n − 1)-dimensional subspace of F , dimen-
sions of which correspond to all the non-empty partial
assignments on X. Hence, for ease of presentation,
in what follows we discuss F as if ignoring its redun-
dant dimensions. However, for some technical reasons
important for our computational machinery, the struc-
ture of F and Φ has to be defined as in (4)-(5).
To illustrate our mapping Φ, if X = {X1, X2} and
x = x1x2, we have Φ(x)[i] = 1 if and only if val(fi) ∈{x1, x2, x1x2}, that is
Φ(x) =
0BBBBBBBB@
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
1CCCCCCCCA
val(f1) = x1
val(f2) = x1
val(f3) = x2
val(f4) = x2
val(f5) = x1x2
val(f6) = x1x2
val(f7) = x1x2
val(f8) = x1x2
(6)
where (6) addresses only the non-redundant dimen-
sions of F .
Geometrically, Φ maps each n-dimensional vector x ∈
X to the 4n-dimensional vector in F that uniquely en-
codes the set of all projections of x onto the subspaces
of X . But is F semantically intuitive? After all, why
should we adopt this and not some another dimen-
sional structure for Ω? To answer this question, recall
that X is just an attribution of Ω (induced by some
application-dependent considerations), and as such it
does not necessarily correspond to the criteria affecting
preference of the user over the actual physical alterna-
tives. However, if the user provides us with some pref-
erence statements in terms of X, the implicit criteria
behind these statements obviously have some encod-
ing in terms of X. Given that, the semantic attrac-
tiveness of F is apparent: it is not hard to see that
evaluation of any such implicit, preference-related cri-
terion on x ∈ X necessarily corresponds to a single
dimension of F . In addition, Theorem 1 shows that
F is not only semantically intuitive, but also satisfies
our requirement of “no need for independence infor-
mation”.
Theorem 1 Any preference ordering P over X is ad-
ditively decomposable in F , that is, the existence of a
linear function
U (Φ(x)) =
4n∑
i=1
wi Φ(x)[i] (7)
satisfying (3) is guaranteed for any such P over X .
The proof of Theorem 1 is straightforward since we can
always specify weights wi associated with all complete
assignments toX such that (3) is satisfied. It is impor-
tant to note, however, that this explicit “construction”
of U only serves the existential proof of Theorem 1, and
does not reflect whatsoever the machinery of our pro-
posal.
Since, by Theorem 1, dimensions F can successfully
“linearize” any preference ordering P over X , in what
follows we can focus only on linear utility functions as
in (7). Of course, the reader may rightfully wonder
whether this linearization in a space of dimension 4n
can be of any practical use, and not just a syntactic
sugar. However, at this stage we ask the reader to
postpone the computational concerns, and focus on the
interpretation of preference expressions in the scope of
our new high dimensional space F .
There are two major categories of preference state-
ments one would certainly like to allow in S [12],
notably dyadic (comparative) statements (indicating
a relation between two referents using the concepts
such as ‘better’, ‘worse’, and ‘equal in value to’), and
monadic (classificatory) statements (evaluating a sin-
gle referent using ordinal language concepts such as
‘good’, ‘very bad’, and ‘worst’.)2 For ease of presen-
tation, let us focus on dyadic statements for now. In
particular, consider an ”instance comparison” state-
ment ”x is better than x′”, where x,x′ ∈ X . The
interpretation of this statement poses no serious dif-
ficulties because it explicitly compares between com-
plete descriptions of two alternatives. However, this is
the exception, rather than the rule. Most of the prefer-
ence statements that we use in our everyday activities
(e.g., “I prefer compact cars to SUVs”) have this or an-
other generalizing nature. As such, these statements
2This classification does not cover more ”higher order”
preferences, such as ”x is preferred to y more than z is
preferred to w” [19]. Although here we do not discuss such
statements, they as well can be processed in our framework.
typically mention only a subset of attributes. This
creates an ambiguity with respect to their actual refer-
ents. Several proposals on how to interpret preference
statements have been made both in philosophy and
AI, but there is no (and cannot be?) an agreed-upon
solution to this problem [12]. However, all the propos-
als suggest to interpret generalizing preference state-
ments as comparing between complete descriptions X
of the alternatives, while disagreeing on what complete
descriptions are actually compared by each statement
separately, and/or by a multi-statement preference ex-
pression as a whole.
Considering interpretation of qualitative preference
expressions in F , observe that each parameter wi of U
as in (7) can be seen as capturing the marginal value
of the interaction between Var(fi) when these take the
value val(fi). Note that wi corresponds to this specific
interaction only; all the syntactically related interac-
tions of subsets and supersets of val(fi) are captured
by other parameters w, and the dimensional structure
of F allows such an independent bookkeeping of all
possible value-related criteria.
Now, consider an arbitrary dyadic statement ϕ Â ψ.
Let Xϕ ⊆ X (and similarly Xψ) be the variables in-
volved in ϕ, and M(ϕ) ⊆ Dom(Xϕ) be the set of ϕ’s
models. Following the most standard (if not the only)
interpretation scheme for OUR, we compile ϕ Â ψ into
a set of constraints on the space of candidate utility
functions [15]. In our case, however, these constraints
are posed on the functions of form (7), which are lin-
ear, real-valued functions from the feature space F ,
and not from the original attribute space X as in pre-
vious works. Specifically, we compile ϕ Â ψ into a set
of |M(ϕ)| × |M(ψ)| constraints 3
∀m ∈M(ϕ),∀m′ ∈M(ψ).
X
fi:val(fi)∈2m
wi >
X
fj :val(fj)∈2m′
wj (8)
where 2m denotes the set of all value subsets of m.
For example, statement (X1 ∨X2) Â (¬X3) (e.g., “It
is more important that the car is powerful or fast than
not having had an accident”) is compiled into
wx1 + wx2 + wx1x2 > wx3
wx1 + wx2 + wx1x2 > wx3
wx1 + wx2 + wx1x2 > wx3
(9)
The constraint system C resulting from such compila-
tion of a user expression S defines the space of solu-
tions for our formulation of OUR. On the side of the
semantics, we argue that C corresponds to a least com-
mitting interpretation of preference statements. This
3The constraints for dyadic statements of the form ϕ º
ψ and ϕ ∼ ψ are similar to (8) with > being replaced by
≥ and =, respectively.
encodes the principle that, if there is no reason for a
bias towards certain explanations for ϕ Â ψ, a most
general explanation should be preferred. In Section 3
we describe how we pick a particular assignment to wi
for a given set of constraints, and justify this choice in
Section 3.1.
In first view, we clearly have some complexity issues
here. First, while the constraint system C is linear,
it is linear in the exponential space R4n . Second, the
summations in each constraint as in (8) are exponen-
tial in the arity of ϕ and ψ (i.e., in |Xϕ| and |Xψ|).
Finally, the number of constraints generated for each
preference statement can be exponential in the arity
of ϕ and ψ as well.
While exponential dimensionality of F is inherit in our
framework (and we promised to do something about
it later), the description complexity of C deserves a
closer look. First, the description size of each con-
straint is clearly something to worry about. For in-
stance, each “instance comparison” between a pair of
complete alternatives in X is translated into a con-
straint with up to 2n+1 summation terms, and this is
a very natural form of everyday preference statements.
Fortunately, in Section 3 we efficiently overcome this
obstacle. On the other hand, the number of constraints
per preference statement seems to be less problematic
in practice, because the number of constraints equals
the number of models of ϕ and ψ, and explicit simul-
taneous preferential comparison between large sets of
models are rarely natural.
3 COMPUTATIONAL MACHINERY
At this point, we hope to have convinced the reader
that semantically our construction is appealing. What
still remains to be shown is that it is computationally
realistic. We begin with summarizing the complexity
issues that we have to resolve.
(a) Our target utility function U is a linear, real-valued
function from a 4n dimensional space F . Thus, not
only generating U, but even keeping and evaluat-
ing this function explicitly might be infeasible.
(b) The space of all suitable functions U is defined by
a set of linear constraints C in R4n . In addition to
the dimensionality of this satisfiability problem,
even the description of each constraint can be ex-
ponential in n = |X| for many natural preference
statements.
In the following we show that both these complexity
issues can be overcome. For ease of presentation and
without loss of generality, we introduce our machin-
ery on preference expressions consisting only of strict
”instance comparisons” x Â x′, where x,x′ ∈ X. Our
translation of each such dyadic preference statement
x Â x′ leads to a linear constraint of the form:
U (Φ(x)) > U
`
Φ(x′)
´ ⇔ 4nX
i=1
wi Φ(x)[i] >
4nX
i=1
wi Φ(x
′)[i]
⇔ w · Φ(x) > w · Φ(x′) (10)
According to this formulation, the set of utility func-
tions consistent with a set of k such preference state-
ments is defined by the solutions of the linear system
C:
∀1 ≤ i ≤ k. w · Φ(xi) > w · Φ(x′i), (11)
consisting of k constraints in R4n . Clearly, naive ap-
proaches to solving such systems will be computation-
ally intractable for interesting n. In what follows, we
will exploit duality techniques from optimization the-
ory (see [2]) and Mercer kernels (see [22]) as used in
machine learning to solve such systems in time that is
linear in n and polynomial in k.
At the first step, we reformulate our task of satisfying
C as an optimization problem. Since the solution of
(11) is typically not unique, we select a particular so-
lution by adding an objective function and a “margin”
by which the inequality constraints should be fulfilled.
Specifically, similar to an ordinal regression SVM [13],
we search for the smallest L2 weight vector w that ful-
fills all constraints with margin 1. The corresponding
constrained optimization problem is:
Minimize (w .r .t . w) :
1
2
w ·w
subject to :
∀1 ≤ i ≤ k. w · Φ(xi) ≥ w · Φ(x′i) + 1
(12)
Note that this reformulation of the problem does not
affect its satisfiability, and that the solution of (12) is
unique, since it is a strictly convex quadratic program.
In the second step we consider the Wolfe dual [2] of
(12):
Maximize (w .r .t . α) : (13)
kX
i=1
αi − 1
2
kX
i=1
kX
j=1
αiαj((Φ(xi)− Φ(x′i)) · (Φ(xj)− Φ(x′j)))
subject to : α ≥ 0
This is a standard technique frequently used in the
context of SVMs [22, 13]. The Wolfe dual (13) has
the same optimum value as the primal (12). From the
parameter vector α∗ that solves the dual one can derive
the solution w∗ of the primal as w∗ =
Pm
i=1 α
∗
i (Φ(xi)−
Φ(x′i)).
The third and final step is based on the observation
that the dual (13) can be expressed in terms of inner
products in the high-dimensional feature space. For
many kinds of mappings Φ, inner products can be com-
puted efficiently using a Mercer kernel (see [22]), even
if Φ maps into a high-dimensional (or infinite dimen-
sional) space. Our task, thus, is to find such a kernel
for the specific mapping Φ that we use in our construc-
tion (4)-(5).
Let us define an injective representation of attribute
vectors x by projecting them to indicator vectors
~x ∈ R2n. Each attribute value is mapped onto a single
dimension. If an attribute value is present in x, the
corresponding component of ~x is 1, otherwise 0. If an
attribute is unspecified, all corresponding components
of ~x are set to 0. Using this construction, inner prod-
ucts for an (effectively equivalent) variant Φλ of our
mapping Φ can be computed as follows.
Theorem 2 For the mapping Φλ : X 7→ F = R4n
Φλ(x)[i] =
(p
cλ(|val(fi)|), val(fi) ⊆ x
0, otherwise
(14)
where
cλ(k) =
nX
l=k
λl
X
l1 ≥ 1, ..., lk ≥ 1
l1 + ...+ lk = l
l!
l1!...lk!
, (15)
and any x,x′ ∈ X and λ1, ..., λn ≥ 0, the kernel
K(x,x′) =
n∑
l=1
λl(~x · ~x′)l (16)
computes the inner product Φλ(x) ·Φλ(x′) = K(x,x′).
Proof The following chain of equalities holds.
K(x,x′) =
nX
l=1
λl(x · x′)l
=
nX
l=1
λl
X
(i1,...,il)∈{1,..,2n}l
(xi1x
′
i1xi2x
′
i2 ...xilx
′
il)
=
nX
l=1
λl
X
(i1,...,il)∈{1,..,2n}l
(xi1xi2 ...xil)(x
′
i1x
′
i2 ...x
′
il))
=
nX
k=1
cλ(k)
X
{i1,...,ik}⊆{1,..,2n}
(xi1xi2 ...xik )(x
′
i1x
′
i2 ...x
′
ik )
= Φλ(x) · Φλ(x′)
cλ(k) is the multiplicity with which a monomial of
size k occurs. The multiplicity is influenced by two
factors. First, different orderings of the index sequence
(i1, ..., il) lead to the same term. This is counted by the
multinomial coefficient l!l1!...lk! , where l1, ..., lk are the
powers of each factor. Second, all positive powers of
any xix′i are equal. We therefore sum over all such
equivalent terms X
l1 ≥ 1, ..., lk ≥ 1
l1 + ...+ lk = l
l!
l1!...lk!
Note that many of the monomials always evaluate to
zero under our encoding ~x of x. Specifically, mono-
mials corresponding to expressions (xi ∧ xi ∧ · · · ) will
always be nullified. In particular, it is therefore suffi-
cient to consider only those monomials of size less or
equal to n, since all others will always evaluate to zero.
The kernel (16), which is similar to a polynomial kernel
[22], allows us to compute inner products in the high-
dimensional space in linear time, and, for strictly pos-
itive λ1, ..., λn, moving from Φ to Φλ does not change
the satisfiability of our constraint system C. To see
the latter, observe that any solution wλ of (11) for Φλ
corresponds to a solution w of (11) for Φ via
wλ[i] =
w[i]√
cλ(|val(fi)|)
.
The difference between the mappings Φλ and Φ is that
the former biases the inference’s prior towards smaller
size monomials, “preferring” more general explana-
tions for user preference statements. On the other
hand, this bias can be controlled to a large degree via
the kernel parameters λ1, ..., λn.
Now, using the kernel inside of the dual leads to the
following equivalent optimization problem.
Maximize (w .r .t . α) :
kX
i=1
αi − 1
2
kX
i=1
kX
j=1
αiαj(K(xi,xj)−K(xi,x′j)−
K(x′i,xj) +K(x
′
i,x
′
j))
subject to : α ≥ 0
(17)
It is known that such convex quadratic programs can
be solved in polynomial time [2]. To compute the value
of U for a given alternative x′′ ∈ X , it is sufficient to
know only the dual solution and the kernel:
U
`
Φ(x′′)
´
= w∗·Φλ(x′′) =
kX
i=1
αi(K(xi,x
′′)−K(x′i,x′′))
(18)
Hence, neither computing the solutions of the con-
straint system C, nor computing the values of U on X
requires any explicit computations in R4n . Through
the use of kernels, all computations can be done effi-
ciently in the low-dimensional input space.4
4We have extended SVM light to solve this type of
quadratic optimization problem. The implementation is
available at http://svmlight.joachims.org/. It can efficiently
handle large-scale problems with n,m ≈ 10, 000.
As a final comment on the mechanics of our inference
procedure, note that it would be unreasonable to ex-
pect that a user’s preference statements will always
be consistent. In case of inconsistent preference spec-
ification, one can use the standard soft-margin tech-
nique [7], trading-off constraint violations against mar-
gin size.
3.1 INFERENCE SEMANTICS
Since the user’s statements typically provide only par-
tial information about her preferences, the constraint
system in (11) is underconstrained, and thus the util-
ity revelation takes the form of inductive reasoning.
If the system has access to a prior Pr(U) over utility
functions, a reasonable inductive inference procedure
would be to pick the most likely utility function U that
fulfills all constraints. In particular, for the Gaussian
prior Pr(U) ∼ e||w||2 this procedure results in finding
the weight vector with minimum L2-norm that fulfills
the constraints. This is exactly our objective in (12).
To illustrate the behavior arising from this prior, con-
sider the statements
s1 = (X1 ∨X2) Â (¬X3),
s2 = (X3) Â (X4),
s3 = (X1) Â (X2).
For this small set of constraints, we can compute the
solution without the use of kernel and get the following
weights.
wx1=0.75 wx2=−0.25 wx3=0.5 wx4=−0.5
wx1=0.4 wx2=0 wx3=−0.45 wx4=0
wx1x2=0.05 wx1x2=0.4
All other weights are set to zero. Below is an illus-
trative excerpt of the ordering induced by the utility
function generated in our framework:
U (Φ(x1x2x3x4)) = 1.25
U (Φ(x1x2x3x4)) = 1.05
U (Φ(x1x2x3x4)) = 0.9
U (Φ(x1x2x3x4)) = 0.55
U (Φ(x1x2x3x4)) = 0.1
U (Φ(x1x2x3x4)) = −0.4
U (Φ(x1x2x3x4)) = −0.55
We believe that this ordering reflects a natural inter-
pretation of the statements. Furthermore, alternatives
for which the statements give no clear judgment re-
ceive utility values closer to zero than those for which
a statement clearly applies. In general, the Gaussian
prior appears reasonable in situations where we expect
the utility function to have a compact form (i.e. the
weights in w are small).
Now, recall that (i) each wi is devoted to capture
the marginal value of the event val(fi), and that (ii)
we strive to a least committing interpretation of pref-
erence expressions. Observe that our inference pro-
cedure implicitly provides us with a reference point
0 ∈ R4n . In short, we have wi = 0 in case there
is no reason to believe the user associates some (posi-
tive/negative) value with val(fi). Thus, consistent with
standard logics of monadic preference concepts [6],
utility U(Φ(x)) = 0 indicates that a user is either in-
different about x (i.e., has no reason to like it or dis-
like it), or neutral about it (user’s reasons to like x
somehow “balance” her reasons to dislike it). More-
over, this reference point provides us with an intuitive
encoding of monadic preference statements. For in-
stance, a statement ”ϕ is good” is translated into a
set of |M(ϕ)| constraints ∑fi:val(fi)∈2m wi > 0, which
can be seen as a special case of (8).
4 EVALUATION OF EMPIRICAL
EFFECTIVENESS
To demonstrate practical effectiveness of our approach,
we conducted experiments on the EachMovie dataset5.
The dataset consists of six-point-scale movie ratings
collected from 72916 users on a corpus of 1628 movies.
Each movie is described by a set of attributes, out
of which we use the decade of the movie, whether it
is currently in the movie theaters, and a binary clas-
sification according to ten (non-disjoint) genre cate-
gories. In our experiments we generate one ordinal
utility function for each user.
The EachMovie dataset contains ratings for individual
movies, but no generalizing preference statements. To
simulate generalizing preference statements, we gen-
erated such statements using the C4.5 decision trees
learning algorithm [20] on the following binary classi-
fication problem. As training examples, we form all
pairs of movies by concatenating their attribute vec-
tors. For each user we generate a separate training
set. If the first movie was rated higher (lower) than
the second movie, the pair is labeled positive (nega-
tive). No pair is generated if at least one of the movies
was not rated or if both movies have the same rating,
since it was unclear how to translate such cases into
training examples for the classification task. On this
data, we run the C4.5 decision tree learner6. Using
the c45rules software included in the C4.5 package we
then convert the resulting decision tree into a set of
rules ordered by their level of confidence, and inter-
pret each of these learned rules as a single preference
statement. For example, the highest ranked rule for
5
http://research.compaq.com/SRC/eachmovie/
6
http://www.cse.unsw.edu.au/∼quinlan/
the user that rated the largest number of movies was
the rule (a) below.
(a)
B_decade = 90s
B_Art_Foreign = 1
B_Family = 0
B_Romance = 0
-> A preferred to B
(b)
A_decade = 80s
A_Thriller = 1
B_Classic = 0
B_Horror = 1
-> A preferred to B
This rule can be interpreted as the monadic preference
statement “the user does not like foreign films from the
90s that are not Romance or Family movies”. For the
same user, the highest ranked dyadic rule is rule (b),
meaning “the user prefers thrillers from the 80s over
non-classic horror movies”.
The quality of the orderings induced by the generated
utility functions is measured in terms of ordering er-
ror, that is the fraction of times where the user rating
and the utility function disagree on the ordering of two
movies. For this error measure we consider only movie
pairs unequally rated by the user. Ties in the ordering
induced by the utility function are broken randomly.
Note that random performance according to this error
measure is a score of 0.5, and that a score of 0.0 in-
dicates a perfect ordering. All results that follow are
averaged over the 45 users that provided the largest
number of movie ratings. To normalize for different
numbers of ratings, for each user we consider exactly
500 movie ratings randomly selected from her rating
list.
The left-hand panel of Figure 1 shows how well the
utility function orders the movies depending on the
number of preference statements used to generate this
function. In this analysis we use the top k preference
statements as returned by c45rules. Each curve in
Figure 1 gives the performance for a different choice
of kernel degree, i.e., different choice of kernel param-
eters λ1, ..., λn. The “degree” d indicates that all λi
with i > d are set to zero, while all others are one.
This eliminates all monomials of size greater then d.
For small numbers of preference statements, all de-
grees perform roughly equivalently, but for larger sets
of preference statements, high-degree kernels substan-
tially outperform low-degree kernels. It appears that
low-degree kernels cannot capture the dependencies in
the preference statements used in the evaluation, and
thus the ability to handle large-degree monomials (i.e.,
non-linear interactions between attributes X) is bene-
ficial.
Since we are using a very coarse description of the
movies, the attributes do not suffice to produce a per-
fect ordering from a small number of preference state-
ments. In particular, the average error rate of the com-
plete set of C4.5 rules is 0.24. Note that this pairwise
classification performed by C4.5 is potentially easier
than the utility revelation problem, since the rules do
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Figure 1: Average error rate as a function of the number of statements in S, where S contains unrestricted
generalizing (left), or (right) only instance level statements.
not have to form an ordering. Comparing the C4.5
performance against the error rates of around 0.27
achieved by the ordinal utility function for the high-
degree kernels, we conclude that our method performs
the translation into a consistent ordering effectively
and with good accuracy.
The right-hand panel shows an analog plot for using
only instance-level statements. Compared to the gen-
eralizing statements, the error rates here are worse,
and this indicates the beneficial expressive power of
generalizing statements. For both instance and gen-
eralizing statements we performed additional exper-
iments using a soft-margin approach. This reduced
error rates, but gave qualitatively similar results. Re-
garding computational efficiency, the average CPU-
time of SVM light for solving the quadratic program
for a set of 64 generalizing statements was less than
0.1 seconds.
5 RELATED WORK AND
CONCLUSIONS
We have described a novel approach to ordinal utility
revelation from a set of qualitative preference state-
ments. To the best of our knowledge, our proposal
constitutes the first solution to this problem that can
handle heterogeneous preference statements both effi-
ciently and effectively. The key technical contribution
is a computationally tractable, non-parametric trans-
formation into a space where ordinal utility functions
decompose linearly and where dimensions have clear
and intuitive semantics. As such, our approach ad-
dresses a long-standing open question in the area of
preference representation, formulated by Doyle [8] as:
“Can one recast the underlying set [of attributed al-
ternatives] in terms of a different [from the original
attribution] span of dimensions such that the utility
function becomes linear? If so, can one find new lin-
earizing dimensions that also mean something to hu-
man interpreters?”
We have found in the literature only one work di-
rectly attempting to shed some light on this ques-
tion, namely the work of Shoham on utility distribu-
tions [21]. Specifically, Shoham shows that a set of
linearizing dimensions exists for any utility function,
and that this set of dimensions may have to be expo-
nentially larger than the original set of attributes. The
result of Shoham, however, is more foundational than
operational. First, the connection between the orig-
inal attribution and the particular set of dimensions
proposed in [21] is not generally natural, and thus it
is rather unclear how to perform preference elicitation
with respect to this set of dimensions. Second, no ef-
ficient computational scheme for reasoning about this
set of dimensions has been proposed so far. Thus, we
believe that our work is the first to provide an affir-
mative, practically usable, answer to the question of
generic existence of an intuitive linearizing space of
dimensions.
Our ongoing and future work builds upon the founda-
tions laid in this paper in several directions. First, we
would like to provide some informative upper bounds
on the number of preference statements that a user
will have to specify before the inferred utility function
approximates her preferences sufficiently well. Fur-
thermore, we would like to study applicability and effi-
ciency of standard active learning techniques to mixed-
initiated preference elicitation in our framework. Fi-
nally, we would like to perform a deeper analysis of
the semantics of our inference procedure, connecting
it, for instance, with the recent axiomatic approaches
for preference revelation such as [16].
This work was funded in part under NSF CAREER
Award IIS-0237381.
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